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Symposium
STRIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF MONEY: LABOR
RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
CRAIG W. PALM*
"Show me the money!" This is the new mantra in professional
sports. Sports is no longer just a game, it is a business - and an
unpleasant one at that. There has been more discord and strife in
professional sports in the last fifteen years than at any time since
their inception. We have heard as much about striking players as
strike-outs. Walk-outs are almost as common as walks. Labor negotiations have become a contentious playing field for the owners and
the players, with both sides talking trash and calling fouls.
The owners claim that they are losing money, or at least not
making enough. They point to the greed of the players as the cause
of all the unrest in professional sports. The owners threaten to
move their teams unless their home town gives them more money,
or a new stadium, or a better lease.
The players claim that they are not making enough money and
that the owners have taken advantage of them for years. The players want to be free to market their services to the highest bidder.
Gone are the years where a player stayed with a franchise for most
of his career. Now players follow the money.
The players have been making a great deal of money for the
owners. Before free agency and other similar practices enabling
the players to shop their services came about, players were woefully
underpaid.' In many sports, a player's average career can be as
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. Professor Palm would
like to express sincere gratitude to Christine Gorgone, who contributed invaluable
research assistance to this piece.
1. See Jeffrey S. Moorad, Major League Baseball's Labor Turmoil: The Failure Of
The Counter-Revolution, 4 ViLL. SPORTS & ENr. L.J. 53 & n.100 (1997) (noting aver-
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short as three to five years. 2 Although some players seem to be in
the game just for the money, most players train hard, play hard,

and are committed to the game.
In the midst of all the labor disputes between professional
sports players and franchise owners are the fans. Remember the
fans? The people who used to count the weeks until Opening Day
and eagerly await the day when they could bring their children to a
game to start the tradition all over again.
In this day and age, "show me the money" even applies to the
fans. If there is a game to be seen that is not canceled because of a
strike or other work-stoppage, the fan must be prepared to pay
dearly in order to see their home town heros in action. A fan's view
of the game is blurred by the ever increasing price of parking, tickets and concessions. A day at the park for a family can easily cost
more than $100 - a price tag that takes America's Favorite Past
Time out of reach for many Americans. The fans are beginning to
view both management and the players as greedy. The fans have
seen the greed turn into strife and almost child-like posturing and
bickering as each side wants more money. The business is not as
fun as the game used to be.
And yet, Opening Day still draws a crowd. We still love our
teams and still cheer for our favorite players. We still sit in the
stands and hope that we can see a game played by two teams and
not by affiliated sole proprietors. Players' statements that "the team
is what is important," and "I am only one player just trying my best
to help the team" ring hollow when you know that those seemingly
selfless statements of team loyalty cost the team millions of dollars.
We, the fans, ask much of professional sports players. We ask
them to be superstars, entertainers of the greatest caliber, role
models and heroes for our children. We ask them to be super
human, to never let us down, to never lose a game. No one remembers the strikeouts that got a team to the World Series when the
age salary in baseball "jumped from $51,501 in 1975 to $76,066 in 1976, and on to
$143,756 by 1980" once free agency was established in 1976. Prior to free agency,
largest average salary increase occurred in 1968, "when the average salary jumped
from $24,909 to $29,303 - a difference of $4,394."). Compare this figure to the
baseball players' average salary of almost $1.2 million in 1994, and the minimum
salary of $150,000 per season for 1997. See id.
2. For example, professional football players have an average career of four to
five years. See C. Peter Goplerud HI, Collective Bargaining In The National Football
League: An HistoricalAnd ComparativeAnalysis, 4 VILE. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 13 n. 11
(1997) (footnote omitted); ROBERT C. BERRY ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 92-96 (1986).
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same pitcher tosses the Series losing pitch. There are no prizes in
professional sports for second place.
The world of professional sports is a world in turmoil. What
has happened in professional sports to cause the turmoil? What is
going to happen in professional sports in the future? What are the
legal issues that have affected and will continue to influence the
labor situation in professional sports? In this symposium, we delve
into some of these questions. We are fortunate to have three articles written by knowledgeable and thoughtful symposium participants that give us a historical background of labor relations in
professional sports and discuss some of the difficult legal issues facing the world of professional sports labor relations today.
The current rocky terrain of professional sports has been
forged by the constant conflicts of interest between the players and
the owners. Originally, the owners in all professional sports had
virtually complete control over all the terms and conditions of
their players' contracts. 3 In order to obtain more bargaining power
with the owners and to try to level the playing field somewhat, the
players in all the major leagues unionized and eventually engaged
in collective bargaining.4 Consequently, our country's labor laws
dealing with the rights, duties and obligations of unions and management relationships form the backdrop of much of our discussion on labor and sports.
The relationship between the players and the owners is not the
normal union-management relationship. A number of characteristics differentiate a "typical" union from a professional sports players' union. Professional athletes players' associations, unlike the
normal union, are far from homogenous. The variety of players
include rookies, journeyman, role players and superstars. 5 These
players can have very different goals and concerns. Because of this
lack of commonality of interest among different types of players,
the players associations frequently have difficulty agreeing on what
bargaining position to take.
Although the respective collective bargaining agreements may
set overall caps on the salaries each franchise can pay and minimum salaries for certain types of players, salaries of each player are
individually negotiated by that player or his agent, not by the
union. The vast differences in skill level and the individual negotia3. See, e.g., Moorad, supra note 1, at 56-57 & nn.16-20 (discussing absolute
power of baseball club owners through reserve clause).
4. See Goplerud, supra note 2, at 14.
5. See id. at 15; Moorad, supra note 1,at 60-63.
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don of salaries has led to enormous disparities in the salaries of the
highest and lowest paid players. Aside from sports, no union in this
country can boast that the average salary of its membership exceeds
a million dollars. 6 Nor is there any other union where the lowest
paid member earns slightly in excess of $100,000 and the highest
7
paid player can earn multiple millions of dollars per year.
Management is also atypical. All the sports management units
are multi-employer bargaining units. Many of the franchises are
not the primary business interests of the owners. Further, the
franchises frequently do not agree on financial matters and often
have different financial concerns. The large metropolitan market
franchises generally are able to make much more money than their
smaller market counterparts. To date, attempts at true revenue
sharing have met with limited success.
Thus, at least some of the problems with collective bargaining
in professional sports are caused by the odd makeup of the labor
and management bargaining units. Many of the labor problems result from the lack of truly common interests on both sides and the
unique relationship that professional sports enjoy with the community and the public.
Much of the rancor in professional sports has centered around
the owners' desire to limit the players' ability to move freely from
franchise to franchise. The owners' expressed rationale is the desire to maintain competitiveness among the teams and to protect
the franchise's investment in recruiting and training players. The
unspoken but primary rationale is that a system of unfettered player
movement obviously results in higher salaries for the good players
and higher costs for the owners. In order to get higher salaries, the
players have been pushing hard for the elimination of the impediments to free agency. The owners have largely resisted this thrust
and their return parry has been to adopt mechanisms to reduce
free mobility. Draft rules requiring players to deal only with the
clubs that draft them, reserve clauses binding players to the clubs
that originally draft them and salary caps trying to control salaries
are just a few of the mechanisms that have been tried by the owners
to limit free mobility of players.
All of these mechanisms are anti-competitive because they all
restrict a player's ability to freely market his services to the highest
bidder and limit a competing franchise's ability to entice players to
change teams by paying more money to the best players. This anti6. See Moorad, supra note 1.
7. See id.
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competitive effect is enhanced because there are so few franchises
that are vying for the services of the athletes. In general, major
professional sports have only one monopolistic league and are literally the only big game in town. Not surprisingly, therefore, much
of the litigation in professional sports has come in the form of antitrust challenges to the claimed anti-competitive tactics of the
owners.
To date, major league baseball has been immune to all antitrust challenges because of old judicial decisions holding that baseball is not subject to the antitrust laws. 8 These decisions are no
longer defensible, if they ever were. Although there have been judicial and legislative rumblings about eliminating baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws, neither the courts nor Congress has
taken definitive steps to do so. No other professional sports league
has ajudicially created exemption from antitrust scrutiny and there
have been a number of important antitrust challenges to the various alleged anti-competitive mechanisms adopted by other
leagues. 9
Although the antitrust laws apply to all sports other than baseball, the courts have created an important nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws. To oversimplify slightly, the
nonstatutory labor exemption often exempts the subjects of the collective bargaining process from the strictures of the antitrust laws. 10
Thus, when collective bargaining agreements or actions taken dur8. See Goplerud, supra note 2, at 17 & nn.25-27 (discussing Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Federal Baseball Club v. National League,
259 U.S. 200 (1922)); Moorad, supra note 1, at 59-61 & nn.40-57 (same).
9. See, e.g., National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir.
1995) (seeking to enforce collective bargaining agreement against union); Smith v.
Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976) (challenging restrictions in professional football league draft), aFfd in part &rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (challenging restrictions on players in professional basketball league), affd,
556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977); Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp.
960 (D.NJ. 1987) (challenging player restraining system in professional basketball
league); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (challenging reserve clause in professional hockey
league).
10. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2120 (1996) (noting
that nonstatutory labor exemption "substitutes legislative and administrative laborrelated determinations for judicial antitrust-related determinations as to the appropriate legal limits of an industrial conflict."); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers
& Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975) (explaining that "[u]nion success in organizing workers and standardizing wages ultimately will affect price competition among employers, but the goals of federal labor law never could be
achieved if this effect on business competition were held a violation of the antitrust
laws.").
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ing collective bargaining have anti-competitive effects that would
otherwise violate the antitrust laws, the courts permit the anti-competitive agreements or activities. The courts have held that the
strong public policy of effectuating the purposes behind collective
bargaining supersedes any antitrust concerns.1 1
Professor McCormick discusses the implications of this nonstatutory labor exemption in his article. 12 The focus of Professor McCormick's article is the recent Supreme Court decision in Brown v.
ProFootball,Inc.13 In that case, the Court decided that the nonstatutory labor exemption applied to the challenged activity even
though there was no collective bargaining agreement in force and
the parties had reached an impasse in negotiations for a new
agreement. 14

Professor McCormick discusses the potential effect that the
Brown opinion will have for future labor relations in sports. Professor McCormick concludes that the judicial decisions concerning
the nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws give the players a choice.' 5 If the players unionize and engage in collective bargaining, then they receive the benefits arising from the labor laws
and collective bargaining but lose virtually all of the protection that
the antitrust laws would afford. In such cases, the labor laws primarily govern the relationship between the players and the owners, and
the antitrust laws will be largely inapplicable due to the nonstatutory labor exemption. On the other hand, if the players choose to
decertify their unions, then they obtain the full protection of the
antitrust laws but will not enjoy the benefits of the labor laws and
collective bargaining. In short, the players cannot have it both
ways.

16

11. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2120 (noting that nonstatutory labor exemption is
implied from federal labor statutes which "set forth a national labor policy favoring
free and private collective bargaining .... ."); Connel 421 U.S. at 622 (noting that
"a proper accommodation between the congressional policy favoring collective
bargaining under the NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets requires that some union-employer agreements be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions.") (citation
omitted); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676, 691 (1965) ("Weighing the respective interests involved, we think the national labor policy expressed in the National Labor Relations Act places beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how
long, employees must work.").
12. See Robert A. McCormick, Labor Or Antitrust? Let The Players Choose, 4 VI.
SPORTS & ENr. LJ. 39 (1997).

13.
14.
15.
16.

116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
See id.
See McCormick, supra note 12, at 41.
See id. at 44.
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Professor Goplerud's article traces the labor strife in the National Football League (NFL).' 7 Ironically, although the NFL has
been the sight of some of the most virulent labor-relations battles in
professional sports, at the moment, it is enjoying a period of relative tranquility.' 8 Professor Goplerud's piece focuses on the struggle of the NFL players for freedom to market their services and the
desire of the owners to restrict that freedom as much as possible.
For a while, the league's strongest restrictive mechanism was the socalled "Rozelle Rule" which required clubs acquiring the services of
a player who had been with a different club to compensate the latter club for the "loss" of that player. 19 As Professor Goplerud notes,
the Rozelle Rule was extremely effective in limiting player
20
mobility.
Although the Rozelle Rule is no longer is effect, Professor
Goplerud discusses other mechanisms that the NFL has used to restrict player mobility. 2 1 The present limitations have been incorporated in the collective bargaining agreement between the owners
and players.2 2 Professor Goplerud criticizes the Brown decision because it does not sufficiently recognize the uniqueness of labor ne23
gotiations in professional sports.
Jeffrey Moorad's piece chronicles the evolution of labor relations in baseball. 24 Although exempt from antitrust scrutiny, the
players have been able to achieve a good deal of progress in obtaining free agency because of strong union bargaining. Initially,
players were at the mercy of the owners because of the reserve
clause found in every contract.2 5 According to the owners' interpretation of the reserve clause, the clause bound a player to a particular club in perpetuity unless the player was traded or released by
the club.2 6 The owners and players later agreed in their collective

bargaining agreement that grievances would be settled by binding
arbitration.2 7 A limiting ruling in mandatory arbitration interpreted the reserve clause to bind the players for only one year and
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See Goplerud, supra note 2, at 13.
See id. at 34.
See id. at 16 & n.19 (citing BERRY
See id. at 16.
See id. at 23.
See Goplerud, supra note 2, at 16.
See id. at 29.
See Moorad, supra note 1.

ET AL.,

supra note 2, at 125).

25. See id. at 56.
26. See id. at 56-57 & nn.16-20.
27. See id. at 63-64 & nn.77-78, 80, 83.
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not for their entire career.2 8 Thus, the owners needed to find
other control mechanisms to limit the players' mobility.
As Mr. Moorad discusses, the owners then informally agreed
not to bid for a player's services against a player's current team if
that team wanted to retain the player.2 9 Thus, the owners agreed

that there would be no competitive bidding among each other for
players signed by another team. Unfortunately for the owners, they
were once again victims of their own bargaining mistakes. The operative collective bargaining agreement in effect when these informal agreements were made contained a clause that prohibited
collusive agreements between clubs. The owners self-imposed
agreement not to deal with free agents was ultimately ruled to be
illegal under that clause forbidding collusive agreements.3 0 The
owners were not only back to square one, but also had to pay more
than a quarter of a million dollars to the players because of the
31
damage caused to the players by the owners' collusion.
The owners have been unable to prevent totally the free mobility of players, but up to the date of the most recent collective bargaining agreement, have been able to limit the types of players who
can engage in free agency. When the owners tried to gain back
some of the ground they had lost in the most recent set of bargaining talks, the players refused to budge. The standoff ultimately lead
to the season long strike in 1994-1995.32 Although the World Series
had survived two world wars and even natural disasters, it could not
survive this labor dispute. The World Series was not played for the
33
first time in 90 years.
Mr. Moorad estimates that the hard out of pocket losses to
34
both sides as a result of the 1994-95 strike were one billion dollars.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See
See
See
See

id. at 65 & nn.91-94.
Moorad, supra note 1, at 66 & n.100.
id. at 69-70.
id. at 70 & nn.125-126 (noting that cases were settled for $280,

000,000).
32. In August 1994, the players went on strike for 232 days until March 31,
1995, when an injunction restored the previous expired agreement. See Stefan
Fatis, BaseballPact Is Ratified By Owners, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1996, availablein 1996
WL-WSJ 11807637.
33. See Jerry Crasnick, Some Unfinished Business: Labor Problems Won't Impact
Fans, DENVER POST, Feb. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 6684260.
34. See Moorad, supra note 1, at 83 & n.228. Specifically, about $350 million
in salaries and bonuses were lost by players, and franchises "combined for operating losses of $364 million in 1994 and $305 million in 1995, and will have lost an
estimated $150 million in 1996 ... ." Bernie Miklasz, Big Deal: Baseball Accord Follows Years Of Waste, ST. Lous POsT-DISPATCH, Nov. 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL

2806187.
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The aftershocks of the unseemly and distressing strike are still being felt, with attendance and TV ratings significantly lower than
pre-strike figures.A5 Fans realized that they could live without baseball and found other ways of spending their time. More importantly, fan sympathy, which had traditionally been with the players,
turned into fan annoyance at both the owners and the players.
Recently, some stability has returned to baseball because the
owners and players reached a new collective bargaining agreement
which will be in effect until the year 2000.36 Again, thanks to the

strength of the union, the agreement retains the mobility that the
players had and contains at least a semblance of the notion that the
owners and players are in a joint venture, as opposed to the players
being mere employees. The agreement also begins to address the
great disparity of financial benefits and burdens between the major
market franchises and the smaller market franchises with modified
profit sharing among clubs 37 and a luxury tax imposed on clubs

whose salaries exceed certain levels. 38 The agreement contains important exceptions to a full profit sharing approach. There is a
35. See Moorad, supra note 1, at 83 & nn.229-230. In 1995, attendance at
games declined nearly 20 percent: specifically, the average attendance pre-strike in
1994 was 31,612, and average attendance for 1996 was 26,889. See Crasnick, supra
note 33; Miklasz, supra note 34. How much of this decline is attributable to the
strike is unknown, however, since the uncertainty of the season caused low sales of
season ticket packages and problems in acquiring advertisers. See Crasnick, supra
note 33.
36. A new collective bargaining agreement was reached between the owners
and the players on November 26, 1996. See Mark Conrad, What Contract Means for
Basebal, N.Y.L.J, Dec. 6. 1996, at 5. The agreement runs until October 31, 2000,
unless the players exercise their option to extend the agreement for an additional
year. See id.

37. Basically, revenue sharing was designed "to help smaller-market clubs
compete for free-agent players." BaseballMakes Peace: Owners Approve "Historic"FiveYear Deal 26-4, MoNTREAL GAZET-E, Nov. 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4214992.

With thirteen clubs giving money while the other thirteen receive it, at least $70
million will shift from large to small markets in both 1996 and 1997. See Conrad,
supra note 36, at 5. However, inequities between clubs will continue since "revenue" does not include monies received from local broadcasting contracts, which
usually comprise the bulk of broadcasting revenues. See id.
38. The luxury tax essentially takes from the rich and gives to the poor, in
order to level the economic playing field amongst the ball clubs. See Conrad, supra
note 36, at 5. Specifically, owner payrolls exceeding $51 million will be taxed at 35
percent in 1997, in 1998 the payroll limit rises to $55 million, and in 1999 payrolls
over $58.9 million will be taxed at 34 percent, with no tax for the remainder of the
agreement. See id. The hope is that the luxury tax will work as an incentive for ball
clubs to stop spending an extravagant amount of money to sign players by creating
a "drag" on salaries, but most likely will be merely a "cost of doing business" for the
wealthier ball clubs in search of a championship team. See id. Nevertheless, the
luxury tax will help ball clubs that are forced to trade players or lose free-agents
due to financial constraints. See id.
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long way to go, however, before the gap between the big and
smaller markets is closed.
It seems clear that the players in all the professional sports
want more of a share of the revenue that the teams are generating.
The players continue to push for ajoint venture or partnership between the players and the owners which would ultimately lead to
some sort of profit sharing arrangement. So far, the owners have
strenuously resisted the players' attempts to form this partnership.
It is difficult to see where the business realities for both parties will
ultimately lead them. The schism between the highest and lowest
paid players continues to grow. Since the superstars really do not
presently benefit from collective bargaining, it is likely that there
will be increasing dissent within the players' unions.
Still, many players on many teams earn a good living without
having million dollar contracts.3 9 Perhaps players should be able to
make whatever someone is willing to pay. If there comes a time
when it does not make any economic sense for players to receive
astronomical salaries, then the market should govern just as it does
in other for-profit ventures.
Factions among different management groups also continue to
be a problem. The major and minor market issues have begun to
be addressed but present formidable economic issues for the owners. The problems among owners, however, seem to be less severe
in those sports with a very strong and respected commissioner. The
owners clearly need to regroup after the latest collective bargaining
agreements.
The future for professional sports is uncertain. Given all the
diverse interests involved, agreement between and within all groups
is increasingly difficult to achieve. Although the intersection between the labor and antitrust laws is clearer than it was, the recent
decisions may result in a "decertify today-recertify tomorrow"
mentality which may make professional sports even more unstable. 40 Ultimately, the parties have to come to grips with the issue of
39. For a discussion of the average salaries of baseball players, see supra note
1.
40. NLRB Chairman William B. Gould IV predicted the implications of the

Brown decision as follows:
[T]he Court's decision will invite game playing by the unions in professional sports as they pretend to commit suicide through decertification or
defunctness so as to be "sufficiently distant" from the collective bargaining process. This regrettable result - one already employed in football

and basketball - may make a mockery of our laws and divert the resources of both tribunals and private parties away from the constructive
process of collective bargaining.
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whether the financial pie will be distributed more equitably among
the players and owners. The real dispute is whether it should be
more of a partnership model or remain an employment model.
Although no one knows what the future will bring, there is a
real danger that the parties' disagreements will ultimately lead to
their own demise. On its present track, the possibility exists that
professional sports will succeed in killing the goose that lays the
golden eggs because all were too focused on the money.
William F. Highberger, The Impact of Brown v. Pro Football on the Future of Multiemployer BargainingPatterns, EMPLOYEE REL. L.J., Dec. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL
10191761.
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